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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 328 Barry Avenue v. Nolan Properties Group, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court held that the statute of limitations under section 
541.051,1 applying to claims of defective construction of an 
improvement to real property, does not require that construction 
be substantially complete before such claims accrue.2 The court 
further held that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to 
when the owner discovered the actionable injury sufficient to 
trigger the statute of limitations, so it reversed and remanded the 
district court’s grant of summary judgment on that issue.3 The 
court’s decision regarding the statute of limitations question 
accurately reflected legislative intent to protect construction 
companies from liability for stale claims.4 However, the court 
should have taken a firm stance favoring a more lenient “discovery 
of injury” standard to protect owners from losing claims to the 
strict statute of limitations period. This approach would result in an 
increase in judicial efficiency and would ensure the most cost- and 
resource-efficient path to recourse for both parties. 
This Note first gives an overview of the historical purpose of 
statutes of limitations and traces the modern trend of applying the 
discovery rule in construction litigation.5 It then reviews  the 
discovery rule’s adoption and rejection in Minnesota common law.6 
1.  MINN. STAT. § 541.051(1)(a) (2015) (“[N]o action by any person . . . for
any injury to property . . . arising out of the defective and unsafe condition of an 
improvement to real property, shall be brought . . . more than two years after 
discovery of the injury . . . .”).  
2. 871 N.W.2d 745, 751 (Minn. 2016).
3.  Id. at 753.
4.  See id. at 750.
5.  See infra Part II.
6.  See infra Part II.
2
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This Note then discusses both parties’ arguments and the rationale 
of the 328 Barry decision.7 After evaluating the relevant law and the 
rationale of this decision, this Note endorses the court’s narrow 
interpretation of the statute of limitations;8 but, it also discusses the 
implications of the court’s failure to clarify the “discovery of injury” 
standard.9 This Note agrees that the Minnesota Supreme Court 
made the correct decision that the statute of limitations on 
construction-defect claims may begin before substantial 
completion.10 This Note concludes, however, that the court missed 
an opportunity to adopt a bright-line discovery of injury rule that 
would be reflective of public policy and facilitate future 
adjudication of complex construction-related litigation.11 
II. HISTORY OF THE RELEVANT LAW
A. History of Statutes of Limitations in Construction-Defect Claims 
Although the construction industry has experienced periods of 
stagnation, such as during the Great Recession, the construction 
industry remains a big industry in the United States.12 The benefits 
of new construction to both construction companies and owners 
are significant: good business with high profits and long-term 
ownership of an increasingly valuable property. However, 
construction also poses equally significant risks to both parties. 
Constantly changing legislation over the past forty years has sought 
to balance and protect the parties’ conflicting interests. For years, 
courts have tried to protect owners’ legitimate claims while also 
shielding construction companies from unforeseeable and endless 
liability.13 To do so, courts have had to balance construction 
companies’ ability to insure and defend themselves from claims 
against owners’ interests in living and working in safe and defect-
7.  See infra Part III.
8.  See infra Section IV.A.
9.  See infra Sections IV.B, IV.C.
10.  See infra Part V.
11.  See infra Part V.
12.  See Tim Henderson, U.S. Construction Is on the Rebound After the Great
Recession, PBS NEWSHOUR: THE RUNDOWN (Aug. 30, 2016, 9:25 AM), http:// 
www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/u-s-construction-rebound-great-recession. 
13.  See generally Paul D. Rheingold, Solving Statutes of Limitation Problems, 4 AM. 
JUR. TRIALS 441 (1996).  
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free property.14 Instead of requiring courts to singlehandedly 
determine the validity of a claim, states have passed statutes of 
limitations and statutes of repose in attempts to establish 
consistency and objectively settle expectations.15 
Many statutes of limitations on claims arising from 
improvements to real property were enacted between the 1960s 
and 1980s as a response to pressure from construction 
professionals over concerns that never-ending exposure to liability 
was becoming too costly to insure against and that claims were too 
difficult to defend.16 Specifically, this movement can be traced to 
the gradual shift away from the privity-of-contract requirement in 
construction-defect claims.17 The privity requirement shielded 
construction and design professionals from third-party claims.18 
The gradual rejection of this doctrine from the early- to mid-1900s 
was the result of a distinct shift in attitude towards favoring 
consumer remedies.19 Although construction companies were 
thought to be more capable of absorbing liability than individual 
consumers, their increased vulnerability to unexpected claims 
drove up insurance costs and drove some companies out of 
business.20 
State legislatures passed statutes of limitations for construction-
defect claims to address these issues in hopes of revitalizing the 
construction industry and supporting public policy objectives.21 
14.  See 2 PHILIP L. BRUNER & PATRICK J. O’CONNOR, JR., BRUNER & O’CONNOR 
ON CONSTRUCTION LAW § 7:174.50, Westlaw (database updated June 2016). 
15.  Id.
16.  See id.; see also Katherine L. Johansen, Property: Adventures in Boondoggle?
The Unnecessary (and Inaccurate) Legislative Intent Analysis of Lietz v. Northern States 
Power Co., 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1555, 1559 (2008) (discussing public policy 
arguments that capping liability would protect builders from timeless claims, lower 
building costs, and improve the construction market). 
17.  See Michael J. Vardaro & Jennifer E. Waggoner, Statutes of Repose—the
Design Professional’s Defense to Perpetual Liability, 10 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 
697, 701 (1995). 
18.  Id. Vardaro and Waggoner trace the first attack on the privity doctrine to
a 1916 products liability case that held that privity was not required where a 
manufacturer’s negligence resulted in a consumer’s personal injury. Id. at 701 
n.39 (citing MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916)).
For a list of cases from the mid-1900s abolishing the privity requirement, see id. at 
702, n.40.  
19.  See id. at 701–02.
20.  See id. at 702.
21.  See id. at 703.
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Most importantly, these statutes were passed to protect builders 
against false, fraudulent, and unjustifiably stale claims.22 
Construction and design professionals faced considerable obstacles 
in defending old claims due to “unavailability of witnesses, memory 
loss and a lack of adequate records.”23 These statutes lent some 
certainty as to when builders’ liability ended and provided enough 
predictability to allow builders to safely dispose of old records and 
pursue new projects.24 
In addition to statutes of limitations, almost all states have 
passed statutes of repose to protect builders and architects from 
long-term liability exposure.25 The same policy objectives behind 
statutes of limitations apply to statutes of repose.26 Importantly, 
statutes of repose cap a construction professional’s liability on a 
distinct date, after which they can no longer be held liable for their 
actions.27 However, unlike statutes of limitations, statutes of repose 
begin on a specific date, which is usually the date of substantial 
completion, and nullify both the remedy and the plaintiff’s right of 
action against the defendant.28 Statutes of repose have been 
controversial since their enactment because they impose a strict 
limitation on causes of action, irrespective of the circumstances of 
the case, and have been the subject of constitutional challenges in 
many states.29 A majority of the due process and equal protection 
issues have been addressed, but statutes of repose are still under 
22. See id.; see also 2 BRUNER & O’CONNOR, supra note 14, § 7:174.50.
23.  Sartori v. Harnischfeger Corp., 432 N.W.2d 448, 454 (Minn. 1988)
(finding that the policy objective behind Minnesota’s statute of limitations on 
construction-defect claims was legitimate).  
24.  See Tyler T. Ochoa & Andrew J. Wistrich, The Puzzling Purposes of Statutes of
Limitation, 28 PAC. L.J. 453, 469–70 (1997).  
25.  See Vardaro & Waggoner, supra note 17, at 714–15.
26.  See James Duffy O’Connor, Suppose Repose Were Indisposed: A True Story
Prediction of Collapse and Disaster for the Construction Industry, 34 CONSTR. L. 5, 7–8 
(2014) (discussing the policy objectives behind statutes of repose).   
27.  See id.
28.  See id. at 6; see also Vardaro & Waggoner, supra note 17, at 715 (noting
that statutes of repose do not extend statutes of limitation but function solely to 
preclude all claims after a specific time period). 
29.  See JAMES ACRET & ANNETTE DAVIS PERROCHET, CONSTR. LITIG. HANDBOOK 
§ 22:4 (3d ed. 2016) (noting that statutes of repose create a special class of citizens
(those listed in the statute) who are not liable for their wrongful acts after a 
certain date); 2 BRUNER & O’CONNOR, supra note 14, § 7:174.50. For a list of cases 
holding statutes of repose unconstitutional, see Vardaro & Waggoner, supra note 
17, at 712 n.112.  
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constant revision to comport with state constitutions.30 Despite the 
controversial nature of statutes of repose, state legislatures’ 
dedication to amending and maintaining them indicates both the 
persistence of the underlying policy concerns and the value of the 
protections these statutes afford construction professionals.31 
Unlike statutes of repose, statutes of limitations are generally 
triggered at the time of the injury or discovery of the injury.32 They 
are not meant to allow defendants to escape liability; statutes of 
limitations “are by definition arbitrary, and their operation does 
not discriminate between the just and the unjust claim, or the 
avoidable and unavoidable delay.”33 As statutes of limitations merely 
limit the remedy available to a plaintiff and “[do] not extinguish 
the underlying obligation,” they have been subject to far fewer 
constitutional attacks than statutes of repose.34 However, state 
legislatures frequently amend substantive elements in these 
statutes, including time periods, definitions, subject parties, and 
subject causes of actions, in the interest of fairness and in light of 
other developments in the law.35 
B. Modern Expansion of the Discovery Rule to Construction-Defect Claims 
Since the enactment of statutes of limitations, the trigger for 
commencing the statutory period has been a source of unfortunate 
unpredictability.36 Where legislation is silent on the specific date or 
action commencing the accrual of a cause of action, courts have 
30.  See Vardaro & Waggoner, supra note 17, at 712.
31.  Id. at 716–17 (discussing the policy benefits of statutes of repose to
design professionals and the design industry in general). 
32.  See 2 BRUNER & O’CONNOR, supra note 14, § 7:174.50.
33.  O’Connor, supra note 26, at 6 (quoting Jewson v. Mayo Clinic, 691 F.2d
405, 411 (8th Cir. 1982)).  
34.  See 2 BRUNER & O’CONNOR, supra note 14, § 7:174.50 (quoting Ray & Sons
Masonry Contractors, Inc. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 114 S.W.3d 189, 199 (Ark. 
2003)); see also id. § 7:174.52 (noting constitutional challenges to both statutes of 
repose and statutes of limitation).  
35.  See Johansen, supra note 16, at Section II.C (discussing several
amendments to Minnesota’s construction-defect statute of limitations, including 
clarifying definitions and expanding applicability to certain causes of action). See 
generally Matthew T. Boyer, Modern Legislation Creates Ambiguities in Determining 
Deadlines for Asserting Residential Construction Defect Claims, 26 CONSTRUCTION LAW., 
Winter 2006, at 28 (analyzing the impact of modern construction-defect statutes 
with independent time limits on statutes of limitations time periods). 
36.  See ACRET & PERROCHET, supra note 29, § 22:5.
6
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struggled to achieve unanimity in pinpointing a trigger that 
protects both construction companies’ and owners’ interests.37 
Courts have identified this trigger as (1) when the wrongful act 
occurred,38 (2) the project’s completion date,39 (3) when the 
damage occurred,40 or (4) when the owner knew or should have 
known of the damage.41 Of these four interpretations, many states 
have recently adopted the fourth: when the owner knew or should 
have known of the damage, commonly known as the “discovery 
rule.” 
The discovery rule mandates that statutes of limitations are not 
triggered until the plaintiff has discovered, or reasonably should 
have discovered, that he or she has a cause of action.42 The rule 
initially applied to medical malpractice and gradually expanded to 
other torts where the defects were likely to be unnoticed or 
misunderstood at the time the tort was committed.43 Many states 
37.  See id.
38.  Id. (“Many . . . states . . . apply the discovery rule.”).
39.  See State v. Lundin, 459 N.E.2d 486, 487 (N.Y. 1983) (holding that a
cause of action against a contractor or architect for defective construction accrues 
upon the completion of the actual physical work of the construction); see also City 
Sch. Dist. of Newburgh v. Hugh Stubbins & Assocs., 650 N.E.2d 399, 401 (N.Y. 
1995) (explaining that regardless of the type of claim, all claims arising out of 
defective construction accrue on the date of completion “since all liability has its 
genesis in the contractual relationship of the parties”). See generally Farash Constr. 
Corp. v. Stanndco Developers, Inc., 139 A.D.2d 899 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988); 
Brigham Young Univ. v. Paulsen Constr. Co., 744 P.2d 1370 (Utah 1987); Gateway 
Commc’ns, Inc. v. John R. Hess, Inc., 541 S.E.2d 595 (W. Va. 2000). 
40. Hasemeier v. Metro Sales, Inc., 699 S.W.2d 439, 442 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985)
(quoting MO. REV. STAT. § 516.100 (1978)) (“[T]he cause of action shall not be 
deemed to accrue when the wrong is done or the technical breach of contract or 
duty occurs, but when the damage resulting therefrom is sustained and is capable 
of ascertainment . . . .”); see also MBA Commercial Constr., Inc. v. Roy J. 
Hannaford Co., 818 P.2d 469, 474 (Okla. 1991) (holding that the cause of action 
against an architect for defective design accrued not at the time the negligent acts 
occurred or were discovered, but when the injury or damage was certain and not 
just speculative). 
41.  See Mistry Prabhudas Manji Eng’rs Pvt. Ltd. v. Raytheon Eng’rs &
Constructors, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 20, 24 (D. Mass. 2002) (holding that plaintiff’s 
knowledge of its injury and cause triggered the limitation period, rather than 
plaintiff’s discovery of the defendant’s alleged fraud and misrepresentation).  
42. Sonja Larsen, Annotation, Modern Status of the Application of “Discovery
Rule” to Postpone Running of Limitations Against Actions Relating to Breach of Building 
and Construction Contracts, 33 A.L.R. 5th 1, 21 (1995); see also Leaf v. City of San 
Mateo, 163 Cal. Rptr. 711, 716 (Ct. App. 1980). 
43.  Larsen, supra note 42, at 1.
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have recently adopted the discovery rule in cases involving 
defective construction, analogizing “the hidden defect in the house 
to the hidden nature of the tort in medical malpractice cases.”44 
While many courts have applied the discovery rule to 
construction-defect tort claims,45 some courts have declined to 
extend the discovery rule to construction contract claims.46 These 
courts reason that owners, unlike patients, have greater control 
over the risks they undertake because they have the ability to take a 
number of steps to mitigate such risks and should therefore be 
subject to a strict statute of limitations for the sake of predictability 
and settling expectations.47 They further reason that applying the 
discovery rule to contract claims undermines statutes of limitations 
and creates apprehension and uncertainty for defendants as to how 
long they are subject to liability.48 
44.  Id. at 21.
45.  See CLL Assocs. v. Arrowhead Pac. Corp., 497 N.W.2d 115, 118 (Wis.
1993) (noting that because tort claimants usually lack control over their risk of 
loss, “a consumer is typically unable to judge or investigate the design and 
manufacture quality of most products offered for purchase”); see also 2 BRUNER & 
O’CONNOR, supra note 14, § 7:174.59 (noting that in the discovery rule is 
frequently applied in cases involving latent defects). See generally Larsen, supra note 
42.  
46.  See Steven C. Bennett, Post-Construction Contract Claims: Statutes of
Limitations and the “Discovery Rule,” 29 CONSTRUCTION LITIG. REP., Sept. 2008, at 1 
(discussing the policy considerations of rejecting the discovery rule in 
construction contract claims); CLL, 497 N.W.2d at 118 (“[In contract law,] unlike 
in tort law, the need to protect defendants from stale or fraudulent claims 
outweighs any injustice caused by barring rights of action prior to discovery.”). 
47.  See CLL, 497 N.W.2d at 118 (declining to apply the discovery rule to a
contract claim because, in theory, contract claimants have more control over their 
risks of loss through negotiation of the contract, choice of materials, and 
inspections). The CLL court also declined to extend the discovery rule to contract 
claims due to the lack of availability of liability insurance to protect defendants 
from singlehandedly bearing the costs of a stale claim. Id.; cf. Brisbane Lodging, 
L.P. v. Webcor Builders, Inc., 157 Cal. Rptr. 3d 467, 474 (Ct. App. 2013) (holding 
that parties that contract around the state’s delayed discovery rule waive the right 
to be afforded its protections during litigation arising out of that contract). The 
Brisbane court noted that while California’s public policy encourages application of 
the discovery rule, it also respects parties’ rights to freely contract without judicial 
intervention. Id. at 475–76. As such, the court held that “sophisticated parties 
should be allowed to strike their own bargains and knowingly and voluntarily 
contract in a manner in which certain risks are eliminated and, concomitantly, 
rights are relinquished” without violating public policy. Id at 475.   
48.  See, e.g., Samuel Roberts Noble Found., Inc. v. Vick, 840 P.2d 619, 623
(Okla. 1992) (“Were we to allow application of a discovery rule in contract cases, 
8
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Courts adopting the discovery rule have rationalized that the 
rule increases judicial efficiency and mitigates the consequences of 
strict interpretations of statutes of limitations as bars to legitimate 
and sympathetic claims.49 However, courts generally tend to apply 
the rule in a limited manner to avoid negating the original purpose 
of statutes of limitation. The discovery rule functions to prevent 
defendants from escaping accountability for their mistakes at the 
expense of owners who may be reasonably ignorant of an injury or 
a cause of an injury; it does not operate to permit or encourage 
owners to assert claims well after their expiry date.50 The discovery 
rule promotes judicial efficiency by encouraging injured parties to 
pursue remedies outside of the courtroom, such as repairs or 
thorough investigation into the source of the defect, before turning 
to the costly and time-consuming process of litigation.51 While some 
courts have liberally extended the discovery rule to all causes of 
action in any professional malpractice suit,52 a more common trend 
has been to apply the discovery rule on a case-by-case basis, 
particularly due to the context heavy and fact-specific nature of the 
rule.53 
Although the widespread application of the discovery rule 
marks a long overdue attempt at national unanimity, in states that 
have applied the rule, courts have differed in their determinations 
of what owners must discover to trigger the limitations period.54 
the legislatively-adopted public policy expressed by Section 109 of limiting a 
builder’s liability after a certain time lapse would be defeated; a builder’s liability 
for breach of contract could extend indefinitely.”).  
49.  See 2 BRUNER & O’CONNOR, supra note 14, § 7:174.50; see also Ehrenhaft v.
Malcolm Price, Inc., 483 A.2d 1192, 1202 (D.C. 1984) (holding that the discovery 
rule applied because the protection the discovery rule afforded the plaintiff 
outweighed any potential prejudice to the defendant). The Ehrenhaft court 
acknowledged the pragmatic necessity of statutes of limitations, but it ultimately 
concluded that the “added burden imposed upon a defendant to defend an ‘old’ 
claim due to application of the discovery rule is not unreasonable.” Id. at 1202. In 
response to arguments that the discovery rule contradicts the underlying policy 
objectives of statutes of limitations, the court rationalized that “a plaintiff who will 
benefit by invocation of the discovery rule will not be one who has ‘sat’ on his 
rights to gain legal advantage.” Id. at 1203.  
50.  See April Enters. v. KTTV, 195 Cal. Rptr. 421, 437–38 (Ct. App. 1983).
51.  Ehrenhaft, 483 A.2d at 1203 (observing that the discovery rule promotes
litigation as a “last resort”).  
52.  See, e.g., Poffenberger v. Risser, 431 A.2d 677, 680 (Md. 1981).
53.  See KTTV, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 437.
54.  See 2 BRUNER & O’CONNOR, supra note 14, § 7:174.50 (discussing different
9
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Some courts require owners to have concrete evidence or 
information regarding the defect before a cause of action accrues. 
Specifically, these courts mandate that owners must discover the 
cause of the injury55 or that damages must be ascertained to trigger 
the statute of limitations.56 However, other courts require no 
evidence beyond the existence of some damage for a cause of 
action to accrue.57 
C. The Statute of Limitations on Construction Defects in Minnesota 
Although Minnesota’s first statute of limitations with specific 
time limits for construction-defect litigation was not passed until 
1965, Minnesota courts have long applied the concept of statutes of 
limitations in construction-defect cases as a way to limit stale claims 
and have acknowledged the important policy considerations 
behind such statutes.58 
jurisdictions’ interpretations and applications of the discovery rule to 
construction-related cases). 
55.  See, e.g., Criswell v. M.J. Brock & Sons, Inc., 681 P.2d 495, 498–99 (Colo.
1984); Williams v. Kaerek Builders, Inc., 568 N.W.2d 313, 316 (Wis. Ct. App. 
1997). 
56.  See, e.g., Bus. Men’s Assurance Co. of Am. v. Graham, 984 S.W.2d 501, 507
(Mo. 1999); Linn Reorganized Sch. Dist. No. 2 of Osage Cty. v. Butler Mfg. Co., 
672 S.W.2d 340, 343 (Mo. 1984). 
57.  See, e.g., Lumsden v. Design Tech Builders, Inc., 749 A.2d 796, 801 (Md.
2000) (holding that the cause of action accrued when plaintiffs first discovered the 
damage and not when the cause of that damage was actually determined); Bd. of 
Regents of Univ. of Neb. v. Lueder Constr. Co., 433 N.W.2d 485, 491–92 (Neb. 
1988) (holding that the plaintiff’s claim was time-barred because the defective 
condition of the building was such that the plaintiff should have conducted an 
investigation at that time to reveal all deficiencies and causes of actions, rather 
than allowing the deficiencies to deteriorate further); Russo Farms, Inc. v. 
Vineland Bd. of Educ., 675 A.2d 1077, 1092 (N.J. 1996) (“It is not necessary that 
the injured party have knowledge of the extent of the injury before the statute 
begins to run.”). 
58.  See Bachertz v. Hayes-Lucas Lumber Co., 201 Minn. 171, 176–78, 275
N.W. 694, 697–98 (1937) (holding that plaintiff’s construction-defect claims were 
time-barred because he complained about subpar materials and continually 
expressed his dissatisfaction with the faulty construction to the defendant more 
than six years before bringing a cause of action). The Bachertz court acknowledged 
the same public policy motivations that later drove construction-defect statutes of 
limitations legislation: “if one person has a claim against another . . . it would be 
inequitable for him to assert such claim after an unreasonable lapse of time, 
during which such other has been permitted to rest in the belief that no such 
claim existed.” Id. at 176, 697 (citing 4 DUNNELL, MINN. DIG. § 5586 (2d ed. 1927 & 
10
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In 1965, the Minnesota legislature enacted a two-year statute of 
limitations for actions related to defects from construction 
improvements to real property.59 The original statute provided, in 
relevant part: 
[N]o action to recover damages for any injury to 
property . . . arising out of the defective and unsafe 
condition of an improvement to real property . . . shall be 
brought against any person performing or furnishing the 
design, planning, supervision, or observation of 
construction . . . more than two years after discovery 
thereof, nor, in any event more than ten years after the 
completion of such construction.60 
There is no legislative history to indicate the exact purpose of the 
statute, but courts have acknowledged that the statute was enacted 
as part of a national trend towards minimizing potential liability for 
construction companies.61 It is important to note that since its 
enactment, the statute has always provided a distinction between 
the two-year statute of limitations and the ten-year statute of 
repose,62 which is now triggered upon a defined date of substantial 
completion.63 While the statute of limitations has been substantively 
amended since its enactment, the limitation period has remained 
Supp. 1932)).  
59. Act of May 21, 1965, ch. 564, § 1, 1965 Minn. Laws 803, 803 (codified at
MINN. STAT. § 541.051 (1965)). 
60.  Id.
61.  See Pac. Indem. Co. v. Thompson-Yaeger, Inc., 260 N.W.2d 548, 554
(Minn. 1977) (discussing the history of courts’ treatment of concerns about 
potential liability of builders and contractors and the resulting legislative 
response); Kittson Cty. v. Wells, Denbrook & Assocs., 308 Minn. 237, 241–42, 241 
N.W.2d 799, 802 (1976) (“While we have no legislative history to enlighten us as to 
the exact purpose of the statute, we note that at least 30 jurisdictions have recently 
enacted similar statutes.”). The Kittson County court noted that other jurisdictions 
enacted these statutes in response to the gradual disappearance of the privity-of-
contract doctrine which had previously shielded builders from third-party liability. 
Kittson Cty., 308 Minn. at 241–42, 241 N.W.2d at 802; see also supra Section II.A. 
62. The original statute provided that no cause of action can be brought
“more than two years after discovery thereof, nor, in any event more than ten years 
after the completion of such construction.” 1965 Minn. Laws at 803 (emphasis added). 
63.  MINN. STAT. § 541.051 subdiv. 1(a) (2016) (stating that date of substantial
completion is determined by “the date when construction is sufficiently completed 
so that the owner or the owner’s representative can occupy or use the 
improvement for the intended purpose”).  
11
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stagnant, and the “completion” or “substantial completion” trigger 
has never been applied past the statute of repose.64 
The legislature’s first attempt to simultaneously protect 
builders’ and owners’ claims was immediately met with confusion 
in the courts. In 1976, the Minnesota Supreme Court first 
considered questions regarding the scope and application of the 
statute in Kittson County v. Wells, Denbrook & Associates.65 Despite the 
all-encompassing language of the statute,66 the Kittson court 
doubted that the state legislature intended the statute to apply to 
all causes of actions.67 The court based this assumption on the fact 
that similar statutes in other jurisdictions contained specific 
language to encompass additional causes of action.68 Resting on the 
assumption that the legislature did not intend that the statute be 
broadly applicable, the court evaluated the purpose and language 
of the statute and determined that the statute was only intended to 
apply to tort actions.69 
64.  See Act of Apr. 22, 2013, ch. 21, § 1, 2013 Minn. Laws 1, 1–2; Act of May
22, 2007, ch. 140, art. 8, § 29, 2007 Minn. Laws 1, 122–23; Act of May 18, 2007, ch. 
105, § 4, 2007 Minn. Laws 1, 2–3; Act of May 13, 2004, ch. 196, § 1, 2004 Minn. 
Laws 356, 357; Act of Apr. 26, 1990, ch. 555, § 13, 1990 Minn. Laws 1557, 1562; Act 
of Apr. 24, 1988, ch. 607, § 1, 1988 Minn. Laws 680, 680–81; Act of Apr. 18, 1988, 
ch. 547, § 1, 1988 Minn. Laws 492, 492; Act of Mar. 25, 1986, ch. 455, § 92, 1986 
Minn. Laws 840, 885–86; Act of Apr. 7, 1980, ch. 518, § 2, 1980 Minn. Laws 595, 
596; Act of May 5, 1977, ch. 65, § 8, 1977 Minn. Laws 107, 110. 
65.  Kittson Cty., 308 Minn. at 241, 241 N.W.2d at 799.
66. 1965 Minn. Laws at 803, invalidated by Pac. Indem. Co. v. Thompson-
Yaeger, Inc. 260 N.W.2d 548 (Minn. 1977) (stating “no action” can be brought 
unless the type of action is specified). The Kittson court observed that “the statute 
does not clearly specify what kinds of actions and what types of parties fall within 
its limitation provisions” and held that the statute’s construction should be 
interpreted narrowly based on similar statutes in other jurisdictions. See Kittson 
Cty., 308 Minn. at 241, 241 N.W.2d at 799. 
67.  See Kittson Cty., 308 Minn. at 240–41, 241 N.W.2d at 801–02 (holding that
the statute did not clearly specify the applicable causes of action, so the reach of 
the statute should be narrowly construed to maintain its constitutionality).  
68.  Id. at 242–243, 241 N.W.2d at 802 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-1.1
(West 1952)) (“No action whether in contract, in tort, or otherwise . . .”).   
69.  Id. at 242, 241 N.W.2d at 802 (“[W]e therefore confine its application to
tort actions by persons not in privity with the party asserting the statute as a bar.”). 
The court noted that the statute specifically mentioned “injury,” which it 
interpreted as legislative intent to apply the statute to tort actions only. Id. at 241, 
241 N.W.2d at 801.  
12
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While the Kittson court briefly cautioned that a constitutional 
issue regarding the statute of repose could arise in a future case,70 it 
was not until Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Thompson-Yaeger, Inc. that the 
court fully examined the constitutional issue.71 The Pacific Indemnity 
court once again evaluated cases from surrounding jurisdictions 
that involved attacks on the constitutionality of similar statutes.72 
The court held that the statute violated the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.73 It reasoned that the statute 
singled out and granted immunity only to certain parties listed in 
the statute, and it left other parties who might be subject to similar 
lawsuits, such as owners and materials suppliers, completely open 
to liability.74 Consequently, the court found that the statute’s 
70.  See id. at 240, 241 N.W.2d at 801 (“[Application] of the 10-year
nullification provision might create grave constitutional issues.”). 
71.  260 N.W.2d 548, 553–55 (Minn. 1977). Although Pacific Indemnity
centered around the statute’s constitutionality, it is worth noting that the court 
also forayed into the issue of what conduct constitutes “an improvement to real 
property,” within the meaning of the statute. See id. at 553–54 (discussing and 
rejecting the lower court’s application of the law of fixtures in ruling that the 
furnace was not an improvement because “it could be easily removed and . . . 
[was] not a part of the real property”). While the meaning of “an improvement to 
real property” is not relevant to the Barry decision, it is important to recognize the 
significant number of challenges that Minnesota courts have faced, and continue 
to face, in interpreting and applying this statute. For a discussion on the legislative 
history of Minnesota Statutes section 541.051 and the corresponding case law, see 
Johansen, supra note 16, at 1562–75. Johansen notes that Minnesota courts have 
struggled to achieve unanimity on a number of the statute’s clauses, including the 
statute’s causation clause, the trigger for the statute of limitations, the meaning of 
“improvement to real property,” and the contribution and indemnity clause. See id. 
at 1573. This confusion is documented by the eighteen rulings on this statute 
issued by the Minnesota Court of Appeals and the Minnesota Supreme Court 
between 1986 and 1988. See id. at 1572.      
72.  Pac. Indem. Co., 260 N.W.2d at 555. The court noted that of the fifteen
courts that have ruled on the constitutionality of similar statutes, ten have upheld 
the statute and only five have found the statute unconstitutional. Id. Of the five 
cases that struck down the statute, the court found the following cases to be most 
persuasive: Kallas Millwork Corp. v. Square D Corp., 225 N.W.2d 454 (Wis. 1975); 
Fujioka v. Kam, 514 P.2d 568 (Haw. 1973); Skinner v. Anderson, 231 N.E.2d 588 (Ill. 
1967). Id. 
73.  Id.
74.  Id.; see also Fujioka, 514 P.2d at 571. The Fujioka court explained that
under such a statute, a plaintiff cannot recover from the engineer or contractor, 
even if their actions were the cause of the plaintiff’s injuries. Id. Rather, the 
owners will be the sole parties required to pay the plaintiff damages, regardless of 
their degree of fault or participation in the injury. Id. Considering the facts 
13
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exclusion of owners and material suppliers from its protections 
lacked any semblance of rational basis and struck down the statute 
as unconstitutional.75 
In 1980, the Minnesota legislature amended the statute to 
address the ambiguity of scope raised in Kittson County76 and to 
remedy the constitutional concerns discussed in Pacific Indemnity.77 
The relevant part of the statute was amended to read: 
[N]o action by any person in contract, tort, or otherwise to 
recover damages for any injury to property . . . shall be 
brought against any person performing or furnishing the 
design, planning, supervision, materials, or observation of 
construction . . . or against the owner of the real property more 
than two years after discovery of the injury . . . .78 
While this amendment cured all foreseeable constitutional issues, it 
barely scratched the surface in clarifying the statute’s ambiguity.79 
Questions regarding applicability80 and timing81 remain widely 
contested in the courts. 
presented to it, the court could not find any rational basis for treating these 
similarly situated parties differently; in the absence of any reasonable distinction 
between the classes or any driving public policy, the court found that the statute 
was arbitrary and capricious discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause. Id. at 572. 
75.  Pac. Indem. Co., 260 N.W.2d at 555 (“[T]he better reasoned position is
embodied in the decisions which hold such statutes to be unconstitutional because 
they grant an immunity from suit to a certain class of defendants, without there 
being a reasonable basis for that classification.”).  
76. Kittson Cty. v. Wells, Denbrook & Assocs., 308 Minn. 237, 241–42, 241
N.W.2d 799, 802 (1976).  
77.  Johansen, supra note 16, at 1569 (“These legislative changes . . . show
how the legislature rectified constitutional problems with the statute by expanding 
its scope to individuals, thereby avoiding equal protection problems.”); see also Act 
of May 21, 1965, ch. 564, § 1, 1965 Minn. Laws 803, 803 (codified at MINN. STAT. 
§ 541.051 (1965)).
78. Act of Apr. 7, 1980, ch. 518, § 2, 1980 Minn. Laws 596, 596 (amended
language emphasized).  
79. Calder v. City of Crystal, 318 N.W.2d 838, 843 (Minn. 1982) (affirming
that the amended statute prevented future equal protection attacks).   
80.  See Sterling Heights, LLC v. Veit, Nos. A12-0889, A12-0890, 2012 WL
5990311, at *2–3 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 3, 2012) (holding that Minnesota Statutes 
section 541.051 applied because plaintiff’s contract claim that defendant failed to 
disclose defective conditions on the property was an action “arising out of the 
defective and unsafe condition of an improvement”); Knoll v. MTS Trucking, Inc., 
No. A10-1736, 2011 WL 3557806, at *6 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 15, 2011) (holding 
that section 541.051 applied over section 541.05 because “[w]hen there is an 
14
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D. The Discovery Rule Applied to Construction Claims in Minnesota 
1. The Original Statute: The Legislature’s First Attempt to Adopt the
Discovery Rule
In Minnesota’s original statute of limitations, the phrase 
“discovery thereof” persisted as a source of considerable 
inconsistency in the Minnesota court system and, consequently, a 
source of confusion for owners, builders, and lawyers.82 Three 
different interpretations by Minnesota courts emerged. First, 
Minnesota courts interpreted the statute to begin to run at the 
discovery of damages resulting from the defective condition.83 The 
courts applied this interpretation specifically to actions of negligent 
design or construction; courts adhering to this interpretation 
emphasized that a negligence action would be subject to dismissal 
for failure to state a claim unless plaintiffs were able to demonstrate 
that damage had resulted from the negligent act.84 Second, in 1987, 
irreconcilable conflict between two statutory provisions, the more particular 
provision prevails over the general provision”); Nolan & Nolan v. City of Eagan, 
673 N.W.2d 487, 496 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that section 541.051, and not 
section 541.05, applied to nuisance and trespass claims arising out of a defective 
condition).  
81.  See infra Section II.D.2.
82.  See Bulau v. Hector Plumbing & Heating Co., 387 N.W.2d 659, 661
(Minn. Ct. App. 1986), rev’d, 402 N.W.2d 528 (Minn. 1987) (concluding that the 
statute’s reference to “discovery” was ambiguous because a number of events or 
conditions were previously mentioned in the statute and relying on legislative 
intent to ascertain the meaning of “discovery”). Further illustrating the confusion 
in this area, the Minnesota Supreme Court disagreed with the Court of Appeals’ 
decision in Bulau. 402 N.W.2d at 530 (“This court, however, has not found this 
statute ambiguous.”). See also Keith J. Halleland & Thomas F. Nelson, The Statute of 
Limitations in Construction-Related Cases: The Return to Common Law and Common 
Sense, HENNEPIN LAW., May–June 1987, at 8, 8 (discussing the inconsistency in 
Minnesota jurisprudence regarding the interpretation of “discovery thereof”). 
83.  See Cont’l Grain Co. v. Fegles Constr. Co., 480 F.2d 793, 797 (8th Cir.
1973) (citing Dalton v. Dow Chemical Co., 280 Minn. 147, 158 N.W.2d 580 
(1968)); Capitol Supply Co. v. City of St. Paul, 316 N.W.2d 554, 555 (Minn. 1982); 
Dalton, 280 Minn. at 153, 158 N.W.2d at 584.  
84.  See Cont’l Grain Co., 480 F.2d at 797 (noting that although the statute of
limitations usually begins at the time of the negligent act, Minnesota courts have 
acknowledged the severity of this rule and have interpreted the statute to begin 
once damage has resulted); see also Capitol Supply Co., 316 N.W.2d at 555 (“The 
statutory time period begins to run from the date that the plaintiff first suffers 
damage and not from the date when the last known negligent act occurs.”); Dalton, 
280 Minn. at 153, 158 N.W.2d at 584 (“[T]he alleged negligence . . . coupled with 
15
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despite these holdings, the Minnesota Supreme Court issued a 
group of decisions stating that the statute began to run at the 
discovery of the defective condition.85 Even though each of those 
decisions involved contribution and indemnity claims rather than 
negligence claims, the court never acknowledged its departure 
from precedent, nor did it address the reasoning behind the 
discrepancy between the “discovery of defective condition” 
interpretation and its prior “discovery of resulting damage” 
interpretation.86 Third, that same year, the Minnesota Court of 
Appeals took an even more conservative approach. The court 
concluded that the statute began to run when an expert inspected 
the damage and discovered the injury, even though the expert had 
not yet informed the plaintiffs of his findings.87 
As illustrated by the three different, but well-supported, 
interpretations, the seeming simplicity of “discovery thereof” 
created far too much ambiguity to foster unanimity among the 
courts. While the legislature addressed the concerns of the Kittson 
and Pacific Indemnity courts fairly quickly, it remained silent on the 
controversial issue of the commencement of the limitation period 
for over twenty years. The diversity in judicial interpretation of 
Minnesota Statutes section 541.051 from 1965 to 1987 finally 
prompted the legislature to action to clarify the discovery rule. 
2. The 1988 Amendment: The Legislature’s Only Attempt to Clarify
the Discovery Rule
In the last case decided before a 1988 amendment to section 
541.051, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the plain reading 
of the statute and legislative intent indicated that discovery of the 
defective condition, and not the damage it caused, triggered the 
the alleged resulting damage is the gravamen in deciding the date upon which the 
cause of action at law herein accrues.”). 
85.  See Ocel v. City of Eagan, 402 N.W.2d 531, 532 (Minn. 1987);
Frederickson v. Alton M. Johnson Co., 402 N.W.2d 794, 796–97 (Minn. 1987); see 
also Bulau, 402 N.W.2d at 531.  
86.  See Pac. Indem. Co. v. Thompson-Yaeger, Inc., 260 N.W.2d 548, 555
(Minn. 1977) (citing Fujioka v. Kam, 514 P.2d 568 (Haw. 1973); Skinner v. 
Anderson, 231 N.E.2d 588 (Ill. 1967); Kallas Millwork Corp. v. Square D Co., 225 
N.W.2d 454 (Wis. 1975)). 
86.  Pac. Indem. Co., 260 N.W.2d at 555.
87. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. C & A Constr. Co., 412 N.W.2d 52, 55
(Minn. Ct. App. 1987).  
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limitations period.88 Following that opinion, the legislature clarified 
its intent contrary to the Minnesota Supreme Court’s 
interpretation: the statute of limitations is triggered upon discovery 
of injury, not upon discovery of the defective condition.89 The 
current statute provides, in relevant part, that “no action by any 
person . . . to recover damages for any injury to property . . . arising 
out of the defective and unsafe condition of an improvement to 
real property, shall be brought . . . more than two years after 
discovery of the injury . . . .”90 Despite this clarification, 
inconsistency in the application of the statute and interpretation of 
“injury” has persisted, and the legislature has avoided amending 
the statute to clarify the definition of what precisely constitutes 
such discovery.91 
Minnesota courts have often found that discovery of injury is 
an issue of fact that is inappropriate for summary judgment;92 
however, there seems to be agreement that the extent of the injury 
is a major factor as to whether owners could reasonably believe that 
the problem was sufficiently solved to successfully toll the statute of 
limitations.93 Courts often look at the frequency and severity of the 
injury to determine the extent of the injury.94 Alternatively, or 
88. Wittmer v. Ruegemer, 419 N.W.2d 493, 496 (Minn. 1988), superseded by
statute, Act of Apr. 24, 1988, ch. 607, § 1, subdiv. 1(a), 1988 Minn. Laws 680, 680, as 
recognized in City of Willmar v. Short-Elliott-Hendrickson, Inc., 475 N.W.2d 73 
(Minn. 1991).  
 89.  § 1, subdiv. 1(a), 1988 Minn. Laws at 680. The legislature acknowledged 
the confusion caused by the ambiguous nature of the previous statute and entitled 
the amendment implementing the discovery rule “[a]n act relating to civil actions; 
clarifying the statute of limitations for damages based on services or construction to 
improve real property.” Id. (emphasis added). 
90.  MINN. STAT. § 541.051, subdiv. (1)(a) (2016).
91.  See § 1, subdiv. 1(a), 1988 Minn. Laws at 680. The statute only states that
“a cause of action accrues upon discovery of the injury.” MINN. STAT. § 541.051, 
subdiv. 1(c).  
92.  See Lake City Apartments v. Lund-Martin Co., 428 N.W.2d 110, 112
(Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (concluding that “reasonable minds may differ about the 
date of discovery of the injury under the amendments to Minn. Stat. § 541.051”).  
93.  See, e.g., Buscher v. Montag Dev., Inc., 770 N.W.2d 199 (Minn. Ct. App.
2009); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. M.A. Mortenson Co., 545 N.W.2d 394, 398 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1996).  
94.  See Nolan & Nolan v. City of Eagan, 673 N.W.2d 487, 497 (Minn. Ct. App.
2003) (holding that because plaintiff cited several incidents of frequent, regular, 
and permanent flooding over several years before filing suit, his claims were time-
barred); see also Hyland Hill N. Condo. Ass’n v. Hyland Hill Co., 538 N.W.2d 479, 
484 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that discovery did not trigger the statute of 
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conjunctively, courts sometimes look at the owner’s proactive steps, 
or lack thereof, to remedy the injury in order to establish if the 
owner had sufficient notice of the injury.95 The owner’s initial 
reaction to discovery of some defect or notice that a defect may 
exist seems to be a heavily weighed factor; owners that appear to 
immediately treat the injury as a serious problem but wait several 
years to commence a lawsuit generally receive unfavorable 
outcomes.96 To avoid adopting a specific governing rule, Minnesota 
courts have generally substituted a strictly fact-based contextual 
analysis.97 
III. THE 328 BARRY DECISION
A. Facts and Procedure 
328 Barry Avenue, LLC (“328 LLC”) selected Nolan Properties 
Group, LLC (“NPG”), both solely owned by John Nolan, to serve as 
the general contractor for the construction of a building on its 
limitations where leakage was initially sporadic and handled by minor repairs, but 
was found when the leak became extensive and irreparable), aff’d in part, rev’d in 
part, 549 N.W.2d 617 (Minn. 1996); see also Lake City, 428 N.W.2d at 112 (holding 
that the statute of limitations was triggered by discovery not when plumbing was 
altered after leaks occasionally occurred and no further leaks occurred for two 
years, but when leaking recommenced and it was discovered that the plumbing 
might be defective). 
95.  Compare Greenbrier Vill. Condo. Two Ass’n v. Keller Inv., Inc., 409
N.W.2d 519, 524–25 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (finding summary judgment 
appropriate when owner was on notice of defects from reports clearly indicating 
the presence of faulty construction, and owner took steps in attempt to remedy the 
problem), and Metro. Life, 545 N.W.2d at 398 (holding that owner’s action was 
untimely because owner was aware of the source of the continual and frequent 
water damage, took steps to fix the damage through its own employees, and 
believed the damage to be significant), with Hyland Hill Co., 538 N.W.2d at 484 
(holding that owner took reasonable steps to remedy the roof leaks and brought 
timely action when an outside specialist informed owner that the leak had become 
extensive and irreparable).  
96.  See Minch Family LLLP v. Estate of Norby, 652 F.3d 851, 858 (8th Cir.
2011) (holding that plaintiffs’ claims were time-barred because plaintiffs sought 
damages for injuries caused by a flooding from almost seven years prior); see also 
Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 775 v. Holm Bros. Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 660 N.W.2d 
146, 151 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that after being informed of multiple 
failed heat pumps, the superintendent’s subsequent concern of a “major defect” 
constituted discovery of injury and commenced the limitations period). 
97.  See Lake City, 428 N.W.2d at 112.
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building site.98 In October 2009, during the “punch list”99 phase of 
construction, NPG contacted Minuti-Ogle Co. (“MOC”), the stucco 
contractor, about a leak near an east elevation window.100 A MOC 
representative visited the property, observed water coming out by 
the window, and told NPG that he thought it might be a window 
issue.101 A few days later, after the leak persisted at the same 
location, NPG had the same MOC representative return and apply 
sealant to the window corners.102 In early November 2009, the MOC 
representative and two NPG representatives performed a garden-
hose spray test to determine the location of the leak, which 
revealed water seeping in on the right side of the same window.103 
Although the record showed no evidence that MOC or any 
subcontractor repaired the leak, Nolan testified that the 
subcontractors appeared to address the leak because all 
subcontractors were paid and 328 LLC observed no leaks between 
November 2009 and August 2010.104 
A certificate of occupancy for the building was issued in 
January 2010, and 328 LLC began to occupy the building in May 
2010.105 In August 2010, 328 LLC noticed water on the floor of the 
building, and NPG contacted MOC to resolve the issue.106 The 
MOC representative noticed the water was in the same spot as 
earlier and suggested that NPG “get [the] window tested.”107 In 
response, NPG and 328 LLC hired experts to determine the extent 
98. 328 Barry Ave., LLC v. Nolan Props. Grp., LLC, 871 N.W.2d 745, 747
(Minn. 2015). NPG did not perform any of the construction work, but it was 
required to select, hire, and supervise subcontractors, and to ensure the 
subcontractors’ work was completed according to the contracts. Id.  
99. A “punch list” is a “document listing work that does not conform to
contract specifications, usually attached to the certificate of substantial 
completion. The contractor must correct the punch list work before receiving 
payment.” Punch List, BUSINESSDICTIONARY.COM, http://www.businessdictionary 
.com/definition/punch-list (last visited Dec. 2, 2016). 
 100.  328 Barry, 871 N.W.2d at 747. 
 101.  Id.  
 102.  Id.  
 103.  Id. The spray test was performed in response to an e-mail the MOC 
representative had received from NPG on October 30 informing him that the 
leaking had recommenced at the same window two weeks after his previous visit. 
Id.  
 104.  Id.  
 105.  Id. at 747–48.  
 106.  Id. at 748. 
 107.  Id. 
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and cause of the water damage.108 A June 2011 report revealed 
multiple window leaks, water damage, and other problems.109 A 
June 2012 report documented water damage and further window 
issues.110 Based on these reports, 328 LLC sued NPG on June 14, 
2012, for negligence.111 
The district court granted NPG’s motion for summary 
judgment, holding that the action was untimely under the two-year 
statute of limitations.112 The court held there was no genuine issue 
of material fact that 328 LLC discovered an actionable injury in fall 
2009, so its 2012 negligence action was untimely.113 The court of 
appeals affirmed.114 
B. The Rationale of the Minnesota Supreme Court Holding 
In the appeal before the Minnesota Supreme Court, 328 LLC 
raised two primary issues: whether a cause of action could accrue 
under Minnesota Statutes section 541.051 prior to substantial 
completion, and whether summary judgment was appropriate 
regarding the timing of 328 LLC’s discovery of an actionable 
injury.115 328 LLC argued that a project must be substantially 
complete before an owner can discover an actionable injury rather 
than a defective condition, while NPG emphasized that the reading 
of the plain language of the statute includes no such exemption.116 
NPG further argued for an expansive definition of “actionable 
injury,” such that an actionable injury would occur as soon as a 
party is aware of some injury, to support affirming the court of 
appeals’ decision that 328 LLC’s action was untimely.117 328 LLC 
maintained that although it was aware of a water leak in November 
2009, it did not discover an actionable injury sufficient to trigger 
the statute of limitations before August 2010.118 
 108.  Id. 
 109.  Id. 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  Id. 
 112.  Id. 
 113.  Id.  
 114.  Id. 
 115.  Id. at 748–49. 
 116.  Id. at 749–50. 
 117.  See id. at 752. 
 118.  Id. at 751. 
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Following its analysis of the plain language of the statute, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals’ decision 
that construction does not need to be substantially complete before 
the two-year-limitation period begins.119 The court relied on 
precedential interpretation of legislative intent in rejecting 328 
LLC’s primary argument that although “substantial completion” 
did not appear in the statute of limitations, construction must 
nevertheless be substantially complete before any actionable injury 
can be discovered.120 
After holding that the statute of limitations may begin before 
substantial completion, the court then turned to the question of 
whether summary judgment was appropriate regarding the timing 
of 328 LLC’s discovery of an actionable injury.121 The court held 
that the timing of the discovery of the injury is a question of fact.122 
The court relied heavily on the standard for a motion for summary 
judgment—to construe the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the nonmoving party—in its evaluation of when 328 LLC knew, or 
should have known, of the injury.123 The court then viewed the 
evidence in the light most favorable to 328 LLC and concluded that 
reasonable minds could differ as to 328 LLC’s discovery of injury 
and held that the district court erred in granting summary 
judgment.124 
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Statutory Interpretation of the Statute of Limitations 
The Minnesota Supreme Court correctly interpreted the 
statute of limitations on construction-defect claims in 328 Barry to 
 119.  Id. at 749–51. 
 120.  See id. at 749–50 (“[W]e cannot add words to an unambiguous statute 
under the guise of statutory interpretation.”); see also Seagate Tech., LLC v. W. Dig. 
Corp., 854 N.W.2d 750, 759 (Minn. 2014) (“[A] condition expressly mentioned in 
one clause of a subdivision provides evidence that the Legislature did not intend 
for the condition to apply to other clauses in which the condition is not stated.”); 
see also Cty. of Dakota v. Cameron, 839 N.W.2d 700, 709 (Minn. 2013); In re 
Stadsvold, 754 N.W.2d 323, 328–29 (Minn. 2008) (“[D]istinctions in language in 
the same context are presumed to be intentional.”).  
 121.  328 Barry, 871 N.W.2d at 751. 
 122.  Id. 
 123.  Id. at 753. 
 124.  Id. 
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hold that the statute can begin to run prior to substantial 
completion of the construction. First, the court’s holding closely 
follows precedent and is supported by strong policy considerations. 
Second, the court’s decision correctly mirrors legislative intent to 
preserve the important distinction between the statutes of 
limitations and of repose. 
The court’s decision that the statute of limitations on defective 
construction claims does not require that construction be 
substantially complete125 accurately reflects the plain language of 
the statute. Such a reading also comports with previous Minnesota 
decisions126 that assumed the legislature’s passing of the statute was 
part of a national trend that reflected the complex public policy 
behind a strict limitation period.127 A contrary holding would allow 
owners to wait until substantial completion of a lengthy 
construction project to bring suit for an injury discovered years 
prior when the injury could have been remedied before wasting 
material, money, and labor. Such a determination would hold 
construction companies unjustifiably liable for unmitigated 
damages and would lead to economic waste of labor and 
resources.128 
Further, contrary to 328 LLC’s argument, holding that the two-
year statute of limitations is triggered upon substantial completion 
would render the statute of repose superfluous129 and would stand 
 125.  Id. at 751. 
 126.  See Fiveland v. Bollig & Sons, Inc., 436 N.W.2d 478, 481 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1989). The Fiveland court noted that the legislature deliberately provided two 
separate limitations statutes: “one running for two years commencing upon 
discovery of the injury; and the other running for 10 years from the substantial 
completion of construction.” Id. The court concluded that this was sufficient proof 
that the legislature “considered the importance of the time of substantial 
completion of construction as a measure for commencing a time period, and has 
chosen not to use this point as commencement for the two-year limitation period.” 
Id. The court also acknowledged that there had been substantive amendments of 
the statute since its enactment, indicating that if the legislature intended that the 
two-year limitation period commence upon substantial completion, it would have 
expressly and unambiguously amended the statute to provide as such. Id. 
127.  Kittson Cty. v. Wells, Denbrook & Assocs., Inc., 308 Minn. 237, 241–42, 
241 N.W.2d 799, 801 (1976). 
 128.  See 2 BRUNER & O’CONNOR, supra note 14, § 7:174.50. 
 129.  328 Barry, 871 N.W.2d at 750. 328 LLC argued that “if the statute of 
limitations can begin to run during construction, there would be no need for a 
statute of repose because all claims would be barred within two years of substantial 
completion of construction.” Id. 
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in complete contrast to the original public policy objectives130 of 
enacting two distinct statutes. Minnesota courts have consistently 
recognized the distinction between the statute of limitations and 
the statute of repose and have emphasized the precise policy 
objectives that the statute of repose furthers.131 None of the 
concerns that the extended statute of repose was enacted to 
address exist here;132 extending the “substantial completion” trigger 
in the statute of repose to the statute of limitations would be 
unnecessary, inconsistent with precedent133 and national legislative 
intent,134 and would undermine legitimate policy concerns.135 
B. A Missed Opportunity to Adopt a Clearer “Discovery of Injury” Rule 
As discussed in this Note, many jurisdictions have expanded 
the discovery rule to apply to construction-defect claims.136 
However, the jurisdictions that have adopted the discovery rule 
differ substantially in their interpretations of “discovery,” which has 
 130.  See O’Connor, supra note 26, at 7. Statutes of repose were enacted in 
response to court decisions exposing building professionals to endless liability, 
which ultimately increased the amount of construction lawsuits and created 
substantial volatility in prices and parties involved in the insurance market, 
resulting in an “insurance crisis.” Id.; see also Michael John Byrne, Let Truth Be Their 
Devise: Hargett v. Holland and the Professional Malpractice Statute of Repose, 73 N.C. L.
REV. 2209, 2220 (1995).  
 131.  See Sartori v. Harnischfeger Corp., 432 N.W.2d 448, 454 (Minn. 1988) 
(acknowledging that the statute of repose was created to eliminate suits against 
building professionals that have completed their work and no longer have any 
interest or control in the improvement to owner’s real property); see also Day 
Masonry v. Indep. Sch. Dist., 781 N.W.2d 321, 326 (Minn. 2010) (noting that 
section 541.051 provides both a statute of limitations and a separate statute of 
repose, and that different and distinct triggers commence each statute).   
 132.  See Sartori, 432 N.W.2d at 454. Such policy objectives include (1) avoiding 
litigating stale claims and (2) remedying problems in litigation arising from a 
substantial lapse of time such as unavailability of witnesses, unavailability of 
adequate records, and memory loss. Id.  
 133.  See Fiveland v. Bollig & Sons, Inc., 436 N.W.2d 478, 481 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1989). 
 134.  See O’Connor, supra note 26, at 7 (citing Tex. Gas Expl. Corp. v. Fluor 
Corp., 828 S.W.2d 28, 32 (Tex. App. 1991)) (explaining that statutes of repose 
“represent a response by the legislature to the inadequacy of traditional statutes of 
limitation”). 
 135.  See Sartori, 432 N.W.2d at 454; see also supra Section II.A.  
 136.  See Larsen, supra note 42, for a collection and discussion of cases that 
have applied the discovery rule in construction-related statutes-of-limitations 
issues.  
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led to understandable confusion and frustrating inconsistency. Due 
to this inconsistency, the case law fails to provide reasonable 
expectations of legal rights to both owners and construction 
companies. States must amend their statutes of limitations to 
include specifics of the discovery rule for the sake of settling 
expectations of parties, ensuring continued growth and 
industrialization, and fostering goodwill between owners and 
construction companies. In the absence of such an amendment it is 
the responsibility of states’ highest courts to adopt one controlling 
interpretation of discovery when an appropriate construction-
defect case, such as 328 Barry, presents itself. 
Due to the inconsistency in their interpretations of “discovery 
of injury” in construction-related cases, it is imperative that 
Minnesota courts adopt specific rules governing such claims that 
are reflective of public policy, consistent with precedent, and 
adoptive of recent trends. Court holdings on these issues tend to 
follow one of two patterns to trigger the limitations period: (1) a 
“lower standard” of discovery that requires owners to bring suit 
when they are first put on notice of the defect or upon discovery of 
some injury; or (2) a “higher standard” of discovery that requires 
owners to bring suit only once they have proof of an injury 
sufficient to maintain a cause of action.137 The discovery rule is a 
mechanism through which legislatures and courts have preserved 
the integrity of statutes of limitations and repose without ignoring 
the injustice of the unavailability of remedies to innocent 
homeowners.138 Both standards emulate this policy to some extent, 
but the higher standard prioritizes a homeowner’s access to an 
equitable remedy. 
1. A Lower Discovery Standard: Costs and Benefits
Courts that adhere to the lower standard generally emphasize 
the policy justifications of statutes of limitations and favor a strict 
construction of statutory time bars.139 Such courts expect owners to 
 137.  See supra Sections II.C, II.D. But see State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. C & A 
Const. Co., Inc., 412 N.W.2d 52, 55 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).  
 138.  See 1000 Virginia Ltd. P’hip v. Vertecs Corp., 146 P.3d 423, 430 (Wash. 
2006) (quoting Ruth v. Dight, 453 P.2d 631, 634 (Wash. 1969)) (“A court must 
consider the goal of the common law ‘to provide a remedy for every genuine 
wrong’ while recognizing, at the same time, that ‘compelling one to answer stale 
claims in the courts is in itself a substantial wrong.’”). 
 139.  See, e.g., Georgetowne P’ship v. Geotechnical Serv., Inc., 430 N.W.2d 34, 
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be vigilant in their supervision of the construction and immediate 
in their response to discovery of any defect or warning of the 
possibility of a defect.140 
The support of the lower discovery standard rests heavily on 
general justifications for strict observance of statutes of 
limitations.141 As discussed earlier in this Note, statutes of 
limitations and repose were initially passed in response to builder 
complaints of exposure to endless liability and spiking insurance 
costs.142 Statutes of limitations and repose thus served as a means of 
revitalizing the construction industry and promoting growth.143 
Relying on the predictability and stability that these statutes 
provide, construction companies are now able to save money by 
disposing of old documents and spending less on insurance 
premiums.144 In turn, this extra money allows builders to engage in 
more projects, without the fear of being hit with an unexpected 
lawsuit, and dedicate more resources and higher quality materials 
to completing these projects.145 While this commerce theory is 
persuasive and particularly attractive to state legislatures, it will 
cease to be a legitimate justification if legislative inaction and 
judicial apathy to owners’ concerns continue for much longer. The 
current dearth of legal protections may cause owners to refrain 
from investing in construction projects for fear of the unavailability 
of an adequate remedy. 
39 (Neb. 1988) (analyzing the legislative intent, which favored a strict construction 
of statutory time bars).  
 140.  See, e.g., id. (holding that knowledge of the existence of an injury, not the 
existence of a “legal right to seek redress in court,” constitutes discovery). Even 
stricter, the Supreme Court of Nebraska held that the statute of limitations begins 
to run merely when facts exist to lead a reasonable person to investigate, which 
would lead to discovery. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Neb. v. Wilscam Mullins Birge, 
Inc., 433 N.W.2d 478, 484 (Neb. 1988). 
 141.  See Georgetowne, 430 N.W.2d at 37; see also Wilscam Mullins, 433 N.W.2d at 
483–84.  
 142.  See supra Section II.A. 
 143.  See Michael F. Lutz, Restore Colorado’s Repair Doctrine for Construction-Defect 
Claims, 83 U. COLO. L. REV. 875, 890 (2012) (noting that the intent of the statutes 
of limitations and repose is to promote commerce).  
144.  Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 24, at 469 (discussing the negative impact 
of uncertainty and old claims on insurance costs). Ochoa and Wistrich also note 
that statutes of limitations allow potential defendants to destroy burdensome 
records without the fear of being penalized. Id. at 470.  
 145.  Cf. id. at 466–67 (noting that uncertainty inhibits a potential defendant’s 
ability to pursue new ventures or economically allocate resources).   
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Proponents of a lower discovery standard also reason that a 
more liberal standard would incentivize owners to neglect their 
responsibility to exercise reasonable diligence in inspecting their 
properties in order to extend the limitation period.146 This lower 
standard, proponents argue, holds owners to a higher degree of 
responsibility, requiring them to consistently and thoroughly 
inspect their properties. Supporting this idea, one court held that 
statutes of limitations simply “reflect[] a policy decision regarding 
what constitutes an adequate period of time for a person of 
ordinary diligence to pursue his claim.”147 However, this 
justification operates under the assumption that any construction 
defect can be discovered through reasonable diligence within the 
allotted time. This assumption ignores an important policy 
justification of the discovery rule, which is to protect diligent 
owners who are unable to discover the injury due to lack of 
expertise or the undetectable nature of the injury.148 Additionally, 
this assumption begins to erode the distinction between the 
harshness of the traditional rule, where the statute of limitations is 
immediately triggered upon the occurrence of the wrongful act 
causing the injury, and the fairness of the discovery rule.149 Critics 
 146.  See Melrose Hous. Auth. v. N.H. Ins. Co., 520 N.E.2d 493, 498 (Mass. 
1988) (quoting Fulcher v. United States, 696 F.2d 1073, 1077 (4th Cir. 1982)) (“A 
man should not be allowed to close his eyes to facts readily observable by ordinary 
attention, and maintain for his own advantage the position of ignorance. Such a 
principle would enable a careless man, and by reason of his carelessness, to extend 
his right to recover for an indefinite length of time, and thus defeat the very 
purpose the statute was designed and framed to accomplish.” (citation omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 147.  Lumsden v. Design Tech Builders, Inc., 749 A.2d 796, 799 (Md. 2000) 
(quoting Goldstein v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 404 A.2d 1064, 1069 (Md. 1979)); 
see Pierce v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 464 A.2d 1020, 1026 (Md. 1983) 
(discussing that the limitation period is a product of balancing fairness to 
potential defendants with preventing injustice to potential diligent plaintiffs).  
 148.  See Ehrenhaft v. Malcolm Price, Inc., 483 A.2d 1192, 1203 (D.C. 1984). 
The court in Ehrenhaft emphasized the fact that owners must rely on the skills and 
advice of the professionals they hire and likely do not possess the expertise to 
immediately identify defective construction or design. Id. The court also noted 
that due to the latent nature of some defects, even the most diligent owner would 
not be able to detect such defects for a number of years. Id.  
 149.  See Leaf v. City of San Mateo, 163 Cal. Rptr. 711, 715 (Ct. App. 1980) 
(“The traditional rule . . . is that the statute of limitations begins to run upon the 
occurrence of the last fact essential to the cause of action. Although sometimes 
harsh, the fact that plaintiff is neither aware of his cause of action nor of the 
identity of a wrongdoer will not toll the statute. . . . The harshness of this rule has 
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of this approach also caution that a lower standard of being aware 
of some injury would require owners to sue any party they believe 
could have contributed to the injury to prevent losing their claims 
under the statute of limitations.150 
Overall, a lower discovery standard would inevitably lead to 
frivolous lawsuits, judicial inefficiency, and a substantial waste of 
money and resources on behalf of owners and construction 
companies.151 
2. A Higher Discovery Standard: Costs and Benefits
As the demand for construction services has increased 
exponentially in the past two decades, so too have the number of 
construction-defect lawsuits.152 While the lower standard directly 
responds to builders’ concerns prior to the enactment of statutes of 
repose regarding exposure to endless liability, the higher standard 
importantly addresses more recent and prevalent issues from the 
past twenty years. The pressure to remain competitive and efficient 
in a booming industry has led construction companies to 
underestimate the time to complete a project, use cheaper and 
more defect-prone materials, and understaff projects that would 
typically warrant a quality control expert or supervisor.153 The result 
been ameliorated in some cases where it is manifestly unjust to deprive plaintiffs of 
a cause of action before they are aware that they have been injured.”). 
 150.  Id. 
 151.  Cf. Hyland Hill N. Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Hyland Hill Co., 538 N.W.2d 479, 
484 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (comparing a more lenient discovery standard to the 
doctrine of mutual mistake, which “promotes economic efficiency by allowing 
parties to enter freely into contracts without first going to the prohibitive expense 
of carefully investigating every fact assumption”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 549 
N.W.2d 617 (Minn. 1996). 
 152.  See, e.g., Robert J. Aalberts, “To Sue or Not to Sue”: The Past, Present and 
Future of Construction Defect Litigation in Nevada, 5 NEV. L.J. 684, 684–85 (2005). In 
Clark County, Nevada, nearly 170 construction-defect lawsuits were filed between 
2000 and 2001. Id. (citing Robert Gavin, Home Builders Face Insurance Woes, WALL 
ST. J., Feb. 27, 2002, at B7).  
 153.  Cf. Darin T. Allen, Construction Defects Litigation and the “Right to Cure” 
Revolution, CONSTRUCTION BRIEFINGS, Mar. 2006, ¶ 8 (2006) (In response to the 
frequency and normalcy of construction defect litigation, the number of lawyers 
specializing in this area of law has increased as well.); Mario Menanno, New and 
Emerging Issues: Top Trends in Construction Cases, DRI FOR DEF., Mar. 2016, at 78 
(“The principal lesson to be learned from . . . recent construction law trends is 
that this area of the law is rapidly changing, and attorneys should not only be 
aware of these changes, but they also should be actively participating in molding 
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has inevitably been an increase in construction and design defects. 
However, as owners tend to not be construction experts, they often 
fail to identify defects and lose the right to remedy due to strict 
statutes of limitations.154 As such, the rigidity of and the lack of 
specification in these statutes of limitations have unwittingly 
encouraged owners to immediately pursue litigation rather than 
attempt to remedy the problem in a less costly and hostile manner 
outside of the court system.155 
In acknowledgement of the national emergence of increased 
construction litigation, states have enacted a variety of statutes to 
curb the number of lawsuits, encourage parties to work together 
again, and promote industry growth.156 A higher discovery standard 
aligns with the purposes of these statutes. Requiring owners to have 
the basis of a cause of action for a construction-defect claim before 
commencing the limitation period necessitates a degree of 
certainty as to the legitimacy of the claim. Moreover, a higher 
discovery standard discourages owners from filing frivolous or 
impulsive lawsuits, which will ultimately increase judicial economy 
and decrease litigation costs for all parties. 
Not only would a higher standard decrease litigation for 
builders, but it would also protect owners’ legitimate claims. Courts 
that have embraced a higher standard generally take a more 
balanced approach: they acknowledge the importance of statutes of 
limitations but also consider individual circumstances and other 
relevant factors.157 These courts have acknowledged that there are 
the law.”); Melissa C. Tronquet, Comment, There’s no Place Like Home . . . Until You 
Discover Defects: Do Prelitigation Statutes Relating to Construction Defect Cases Really 
Protect the Needs of Homeowners and Developers?, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1249, 1262 
(2004).  
 154.  See Allen, supra note 153, ¶ 1. 
 155.  See Aalberts, supra note 152, at 686 (noting that in many cases, only 
owners who have financial resources have the luxury of pursuing litigation). 
Aalberts notes that during the rise of construction litigation, despite litigation only 
being a viable option for some owners, the financial costs and the damage to 
construction companies’ reputations created animosity towards all owners 
complaining about defects. Id. at 687. As a result, when owners tried to pursue 
amicable remedies outside of the court system, such as asking builders to fix the 
problem, builders were sometimes reluctant to cooperate. Id.     
 156.  See Menanno, supra note 153; see also Tronquet, supra note 153, at 1263.   
 157.  See supra Sections II.C–D. Minnesota courts have looked at a number of 
extraneous factors, including public policy, comparative jurisprudence, and recent 
history. See Ehrenhaft v. Malcolm Price, Inc., 483 A.2d 1192, 1203 (D.C. 1984) 
(holding that a liberal discovery rule applies after balancing the burden to the 
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limits to an owner’s ability to be diligent.158 An owner cannot be 
expected to shoulder the entire burden of supervision, particularly 
when the owner has entrusted paid construction professionals to 
perform defect-free work on personal property.159 In cases where 
diligence is not the issue, owners should not worry about losing 
claims for defects that they could not have been aware of. Such 
situations can occur when a manifestation of a defect is not obvious 
to the owner160 or when an injury is temporarily abated but 
recurring over a period of time.161 
3. The 328 Barry Decision’s Bearing on the Discovery of Injury
Standard
In 328 Barry, the Minnesota Supreme Court correctly found 
that there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding the timing 
of 328 LLC’s discovery of an actionable injury.162 However, in its 
discussion on this matter, the court should have addressed the 
impact of its strict statute of limitations holding on Minnesota’s 
standard for “discovery” of actionable injury. If the statute of 
limitations can begin before substantial completion, the standard 
for discovery of actionable injury must be higher. The court 
alluded to a higher standard by distinguishing the present case 
from a prior case where discovery of injury was found immediately 
after completion of construction,163 but the court failed to explicitly 
defendant of defending an older claim with the practical purposes of statutes of 
limitations). 
 158.  See supra Sections II.C–D. 
 159.  See Ehrenhaft, 483 A.2d at 1202 (noting that an owner should not be 
reasonably expected to hire additional experts to oversee the construction work).  
 160.  See Performing Arts Ctr. Auth. v. Clark Constr. Grp., 789 So.2d 392, 394 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (“Where the manifestation is not obvious but could be 
due to causes other than an actionable defect, notice as a matter of law may not be 
inferred.”).   
 161.  Kulpinski v. City of Tarpon Springs, 473 So.2d 813, 814 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1985) (holding that the owner was entitled to a cause of action for damages 
for each recurrence of the damage during the limitation period, even though suit 
was filed outside of the one-year limitation period after the owner first noticed the 
injury). 
 162.  328 Barry Ave., LLC v. Nolan Props. Grp., LLC, 871 N.W.2d 745, 753 
(Minn. 2015). 
 163.  Id. at 752 (citing Day Masonry v. Indep. Sch. Dist. 347, 781 N.W.2d 321, 
334 (Minn. 2010) (holding that the school district’s claims were time-barred 
because it discovered the problem as soon as the school opened but failed to bring 
suit until several years later)).   
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establish any definite rule defining Minnesota’s discovery 
standard.164 
As strict interpretations of statutes of limitations and the 
incorporation of statutes of repose exist to protect construction 
companies from unjustifiable liability exposure,165 so too should 
lenient interpretations of “discovery of injury” exist to allow owners 
to hold construction companies accountable for legitimate claims 
of actual injury.166 Thus, to equalize legal protections for both 
parties, Minnesota courts should adopt the higher standard for 
Minnesota’s discovery rule.167 While Minnesota courts have differed 
in their approaches in the past, taking a firm stance on this 
interpretation would be consistent with precedent, would be good 
public policy, and would provide invaluable guidance for inevitable 
future construction litigation in Minnesota.168 The Minnesota 
Supreme Court missed an important opportunity to take a firm 
stance and adopt the higher standard as Minnesota’s discovery rule. 
C. In Support of a Higher Discovery of Injury Standard: Through the 
Lens of a Minnesota Court 
The Minnesota Supreme Court could adopt the higher 
standard through an interpretation of Minnesota Statutes section 
541.051. Applying the higher standard for the discovery rule in 
 164.  Id.  
 165.  Marianne M. Jennings, Reposing: An Evolving Issue, 34 REAL EST. L.J. 470, 
471 (2006). Jennings also cites concern about the decline in services provided by 
construction companies as a result of high costs of insurance and litigation as an 
argument for enacting of statutes of limitations. Id. at 470.  
166.  Peggy Rose Revocable Tr. v. Eppich, 640 N.W.2d 601, 608 (Minn. 2002) 
(citing Schmucking v. Mayo, 183 Minn. 37, 40, 235 N.W. 633, 634 (1931)) 
(discussing the rationale of the discovery rule in preventing the preclusion of 
legitimate claims by aggrieved parties before they even know they have a valid 
claim). 
 167.  But cf. Harvard Law Review Ass’n, Developments in the Law Statutes of 
Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1205 (1950) (“As between the duly diligent 
plaintiff and the wrongdoer, the courts have been unnecessarily sympathetic 
towards the latter, in shortening the period in which it is likely that the plaintiff 
will bring an action or in entirely depriving the plaintiff of a practical remedy.”). 
 168.  See Greenbrier Vill. Condo. Two Ass’n v. Keller Inv., Inc., 409 N.W.2d 
519, 523 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (citing Bulau v. Hector Plumbing & Heating Co., 
402 N.W.2d 528, 530 (Minn. 1987)) (“In Minnesota, the harshness of [the statute 
of limitations] has been recognized and . . . the statute begins to run when some 
damage occurs which would entitle the victim to maintain a cause of action.”). 
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Minnesota would not be judicial legislation. This Section examines 
the higher standard as an issue of statutory interpretation as 
though it were before a Minnesota court. This analysis relies solely 
on factors that Minnesota courts have considered when 
interpreting section 541.051. 
1. Legislative Intent
Significant literature exists explaining the intent behind the 
initial passage of statutes of limitations in construction-defect 
litigation.169 Minnesota courts have duly accepted that the primary 
motivations behind the original enactment of Minnesota Statutes 
section 541.051 were (1) the erosion of the privity-of-contract 
doctrine and (2) the need to establish protections for builders 
against endless liability.170 However, the changing climate of the 
construction industry in the 1980s spurred a change in policy 
considerations.171 When clarifying the discovery rule in 1988, the 
legislature’s primary goal was no longer protecting construction 
industry professionals but “to handle fairly and predictably the 
various circumstances that can arise in construction litigation.”172 
In amending the discovery rule, the legislature considered 
various hypothetical situations in which a construction-defect 
lawsuit might arise. The legislature discussed three likely situations: 
(1) a cause of action arising out of a personal injury caused by a 
sudden event; (2) a cause of action arising out of economic loss 
caused by a sudden event; and (3) a cause of action arising out of 
an economic loss not caused by a sudden event.173 The evaluation 
of these diverse hypotheticals indicates an intent to account for 
many types of property owners and protect as many legitimate 
 169.  See supra Sections II.A, II.C.  
 170.  See Kittson Cty. v. Wells, Denbrook & Assocs., 308 Minn. 237, 241–42, 241 
N.W.2d 799, 802 (1976). 
 171.  See Johansen, supra note 16, at 1572–73 (discussing the sharp increase in 
construction-defect litigation following the construction boom of the 1980s). 
 172.  See Halleland & Nelson, supra note 82, at 28. Halleland and Nelson note 
that the legislature’s purpose was also to clarify that, contrary to judicial 
presumption, the statute was not intended to “abrogate” the common law. Id. 
 173.  Id. The first two hypotheticals assume that the discovery of the injury will 
be obvious, coinciding with the occurrence of the sudden event. Id. In the third 
hypothetical, the limitations period is triggered upon discovery of an injury 
sufficient to maintain a cause of action. Id. Halleland and Nelson reason that the 
third hypothetical reaffirms a recent decision that “punch list” items should not 
form the basis for a cause of action. Id.  
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claims as possible. The particular consideration the legislature gave 
to owners who do not discover the injury for several years by no 
fault of their own but due to the latent nature of the defect 
demonstrates a deliberate commitment to furthering the policy 
objectives of the discovery rule.174 The legislature’s careful 
consideration of protecting claims arising from both obvious and 
subtle injuries signifies an inclusive trend and a rejection of a 
stringent construction of the statute to which Minnesota courts 
previously adhered. 
2. Precedent
Although Minnesota case law has been somewhat inconsistent 
since the 1988 amendment, patterns have emerged, and underlying 
trends have become more apparent.175 On the surface, case law 
from the past ten years appears to indicate a trend towards time-
barring most claims.176 However, an evaluation of the specific facts 
behind these holdings reveals underlying trends reflective of public 
policy. In a majority of the recent construction-defect cases, the 
courts based their decisions heavily on what the owner actually 
knew about the injury and how the owner responded to that 
knowledge.177 If the owner was informed of either the existence of 
an extensive injury or the development of a potentially grave injury 
from a credible source, courts have generally agreed that this 
knowledge constitutes discovery.178 Many courts have taken the 
 174.  See Ehrenhaft v. Malcolm Price, Inc., 483 A.2d 1192, 1202 (D.C. Cir. 
1984) (noting that the discovery rule aligns with notions of justice in that it 
recognizes the difficulty in discovering a latent construction deficiency).  
 175.  See supra Section II.D. 
 176.  See generally Minch Family LLLP v. Estate of Norby, 652 F.3d 851 (8th Cir. 
2011); Day Masonry v. Indep. Sch. Dist. 347, 781 N.W.2d 321 (Minn. 2010); 
Glendalough Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Nassar, No. A15-0230, 2015 WL 7357196 
(Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 23, 2015); Sterling Heights, LLC v. Veit, No. A12-0889, 2012 
WL 5990311 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 3, 2012).  
 177.  See infra notes 180, 181, 183 and accompanying text. 
 178.  See Glendalough, 2015 WL 7357196, at *2 (holding that plaintiff 
discovered the injury after an engineer he had hired to survey his damaged 
landscaping informed him of the sources of the damage and warned him that the 
defects would devalue his home and “potentially create an unsafe situation”); see 
also Sterling Heights, 2012 WL 5990311, at *4 (holding that plaintiff’s claims were 
time-barred because plaintiff received reports of the defects from two separate 
sources in 2003 and was informed of these defects again in 2006 when he hired an 
expert to inspect the building but failed to bring suit until 2010). 
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inquiry one step further, finding that if the owner responds to a 
problem as though he or she believes it to be serious, discovery is 
found at the time of that response.179 
Despite initial impressions, these holdings are not an 
indication that Minnesota courts are less sympathetic to the plight 
of homeowners faced with damaging and costly construction 
defects.180 In fact, in Fuhr v. D.A. Smith Builders, Inc., the Minnesota 
Court of Appeals explicitly rejected the idea that “the legislature 
intended to require homeowners to engage in an exhaustive 
investigation absent facts that would place a reasonable person on 
notice that such an investigation is prudent.”181 This plaintiff-
centered approach goes no further than ensuring that owners do 
not sit on their rights.182 The focus on the actions of the owner, as 
opposed to the extent or nature of the injury, corresponds with the 
proposed higher standard and mirrors the underlying policy 
 179.  See Minch, 652 F.3d at 858 (holding that the date of discovery of injury 
was the date plaintiffs first complained to the Watershed District about the 
flooding); Smith v. Lindstrom Cleaning and Constr., Inc., No. A07-1122, 2008 WL 
2020493, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. May 12, 2008) (holding that discovery was found 
when plaintiff wrote a letter to her insurance agent stating that she firmly believed 
that the mold causing her health problems was a direct result of defendant’s 
construction). But see Lake City Apartments v. Lund-Martin Co., 417 N.W.2d 704, 
708 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that plaintiff acted as a responsible property 
owner by installing a valve that appeared to fix the leak and therefore plaintiff’s 
claims did not begin to accrue until the leaks occurred again two years later). The 
court in Lake City Apartments noted that plaintiff would not have been able to 
maintain a cause of action if it had brought suit after it reasonably believed it had 
repaired the problem and the defect appeared to be fixed. Id.   
 180.  Cf. Ehrenhaft v. Malcolm Price, Inc., 483 A.2d 1192, 1202 (D.C. 1984) 
(noting that under the discovery rule, courts take into consideration the fact that 
owners are generally not construction experts and must rely on the expertise and 
advice of professionals in the field).  
 181.  No. A04-2457, 2005 WL 3371035, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 13, 2005) 
(holding that a genuine issue of material fact as to date of discovery existed where 
owners promptly fixed what they understood to be the problem after noticing 
water damage, did not experience water damage for over four years, and then 
discovered extensive water damage and received reports identifying the cause of 
the damage). 
 182.  The Fuhr court reasoned that “[a] contrary result would force Fuhrs to 
choose between taking what they claim was a prudent corrective action and then 
being barred by the statute of limitations from further claims, and undertaking an 
exhaustive, invasive inspection of their entire home, including tearing out 
sheetrock and insulation to determine whether systemic problems exist.” Id.; see 
also Ehrenhaft, 483 A.2d at 1203 (“A plaintiff who will benefit by invocation of the 
discovery rule will not be one who has ‘sat’ on his rights to gain legal advantage.”). 
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objectives behind the original purpose of these statutes: prompt 
investigation into construction defects to ensure low-cost and time-
efficient litigation of these matters as amicably and fairly as 
possible.183 
3. Common-Sense Approach
The Minnesota Supreme Court first adopted the common-
sense approach in Kloster-Madsen, Inc. v. Tafi’s, Inc. in 1975.184 The 
court was tasked with determining whether work performed by an 
electrician constituted an “improvement” within the meaning of 
Minnesota Statutes section 514.05.185 To make this determination, 
the court relied on the dictionary definition of “improvement” 
compounded with its implicit definition in the statute.186 The court 
then revisited this common-sense approach in Pacific Indemnity, 
affirming the utility of this approach in evaluating the language of 
this statute.187 
As Minnesota courts have repeatedly relied on this interpretive 
tool, the same common-sense approach can be applied here to 
lend clarity to the phrase “discovery of injury.” By dictionary 
definition, “injury” is “hurt, damage, or loss sustained” or the 
“violation of another’s rights for which the law allows an action to 
recover damages.”188 Applying that definition to the phrase 
“discovery of injury” as it is used in the statute, “injury” warrants the 
183.  Halleland & Nelson, supra note 82, at 8. 
184.  303 Minn. 59, 63, 226 N.W.2d 603, 606 (1975). 
 185.  Id. 
 186.  Id. at 63–64, 226 N.W.2d at 607 (citing WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INT’L 
DICTIONARY 1138 (1971)) (defining improvement as a mixed question of fact and 
law). 
 187.  Pacific Indem. Co. v. Thompson-Yaeger, Inc., 260 N.W.2d 548, 554 
(Minn. 1977) (quoting Kloster-Madsen, 303 Minn. at 63, 226 N.W.2d at 607) (“[A]n 
improvement is ‘a permanent addition to or betterment of real property that 
enhances its capital value and that involves the expenditure of labor or money and 
is designed to make the property more useful or valuable as distinguished from 
ordinary repairs.’”), superseded by statute, MINN. STAT. § 541.051, as recognized in 
Siewert v. N. States Power Co., 793 N.W.2d 272, 286 (Minn. 2011). The Pacific 
Indemnity court noted that this “common usage” approach had also been recently 
adopted by the Wisconsin Supreme Court. 260 N.W.2d at 554 (citing Kallas 
Millwork Corp. v. Square D Co., 225 N.W.2d 454, 456 (Wis. 1975)). The Minnesota 
Supreme Court implemented Wisconsin’s common-sense approach to determine 
that the installation of a furnace constituted an improvement to real property. Id. 
 188.  Injury, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com 
/dictionary/injury (last visited Oct. 11, 2016).  
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showing of some loss or damage that would allow the plaintiff to 
maintain a cause of action. Looking no further than the plain 
language of the statute, observation or notice of any defect is not 
enough to form the basis of an action to recover damages. Rather, 
this definition warrants the necessity of investigation by the owner 
to ascertain whether or not the defect actually caused some damage 
or loss to avoid dismissal for failure to state a cause of action. Thus, 
the common-sense interpretation of “discovery of injury” rejects the 
lower standard of requiring owners to bring suit upon awareness of 
some injury189 and more closely aligns with the higher proof of 
injury standard. 
4. Recent Developments in the Law
Prior to the Minnesota legislature passing the original statute 
of limitations, construction professionals had little to no legal 
protections to shield them from endless liability.190 In light of the 
dire state of construction companies at that time, statutes that 
heavily favored builders were long past due. Balancing the legal 
protections of both construction companies and owners was not 
the focus or even a priority.191 Rather, the sole objective of these 
statutes was drastically limiting builders’ exposure to liability.192 
However, today’s climate is much different. The construction 
industry has been revitalized, and significant legal protections exist 
to insulate builders.193 Although legislatures acted fairly quickly to 
 189.  The defendants in 328 Barry urged the court to adopt the reasoning that 
discovery begins as “long as [the party] is aware of some injury.” 328 Barry Ave., 
LLC v. Nolan Properties Grp., LLC, 871 N.W.2d 745, 752 (Minn. 2015) (citing Day 
Masonry v. Indep. Sch. Dist. 347, 781 N.W.2d 321, 334 (Minn. 2010)). However, 
the 328 Barry defendants misunderstood the Day Masonry court’s holding, so their 
reliance on Day Masonry was misplaced. The court in Day Masonry held that 
discovery began when plaintiff was aware of both the problem and “the need to 
take action to repair the problem.” 781 N.W.2d at 334. 
 190.  See supra Section II.A. 
 191.  See Ali v. City of Detroit, 554 N.W.2d 384, 387 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996) 
(“[T]he statute is not designed to protect owners of the property, building, or 
improvement.”). 
 192.  Id. (citing Witherspoon v. Guilford, 511 N.W.2d 720, 723–24 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1994)) (“The purpose of the statute of repose is to shield architects, 
engineers, and contractors from stale claims and relieve them of open-ended 
liability for defects in workmanship.”). 
 193.  See Allen, supra note 153, ¶¶ 1–2 (discussing variations of “right to cure” 
laws designed to shield construction professionals from excessive legislation).  
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remedy builders’ concerns in the 1960s, few statutes have been 
passed to address recent homeowner plights.194 Most notably, many 
states have enacted home warranty statutes over the past twenty 
years in an attempt to protect purchasers of homes.195 However, 
many of these laws conflict with time limits in statutes of limitations 
and repose and are therefore too ambiguous to provide owners 
with reasonable expectations.196 In Minnesota, the home warranty 
statute has received criticism that it does not provide a complete, or 
even sufficient, remedy to homeowners.197 
Embedded within these home warranty statutes, many states 
have also enacted “right to cure” or “notice and opportunity to 
repair” laws, which require owners to provide builders with written 
 194.  See Boyer, supra note 35, at 28 n.4.  
 195.  See Charles L. Armstrong, Comment, Who Pays the Price for Defective Home 
Construction? A Note on Buecher v. Centex Homes, 53 BAYLOR L. REV. 687, 701 
(2001) (noting that statutory warranties intend to protect consumers and 
incentivize sellers and builders to provide defect-free products). But see Amy L. 
McDaniel, Note, The New York Housing Merchant Warranty Statute: Analysis and 
Proposals, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 754, 754 (1990) (cautioning that New York’s home 
warranty statute failed to protect consumer rights and did not encourage builders 
to construct defect-free homes). 
 196.  See Boyer, supra note 35, at 29 (noting that the overlap of construction-
defect claims arising from home warranty statutes and statutes of limitation and 
repose has prompted many states to clarify when each statute applies). Boyer notes 
that some states have specified that breach of warranty claims resulting in defects 
supersede other statutes of limitations or repose. Id. (citing LA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 9:3141 (1999); MISS. CODE ANN. § 83-58-1 (1997); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 777
(1988); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-70.1 (2011)). Boyer cautions that many states have 
been silent on the issue, resulting in ambiguity for homeowners and inconsistency 
in the case law. See id. at 30 (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. § 47-116 (1980); IND. CODE 
§ 32-27-2-1 (2016); MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 10-601 (West 2002); MINN. STAT.
§ 327A.02 (2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 46:3B-1).
197.  See Terri A. Tersteeg, Minnesota’s Moisty, Moldy Morass: A Comment on
Construction Defect Claims in Minnesota, 33 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1551, 1568–71 
(2007) (discussing the complexities of home warranty cases in Minnesota and 
cautioning that even in best-case scenarios, homeowners do not recoup their 
financial losses). Under Minnesota’s home warranty statute, owners lose their right 
to recovery if they do not provide written notice to the general contractor within 
six months after the owner discovers or should have discovered the damage. MINN.
STAT. § 327A.03 (2016). Tersteeg notes that the courts’ strict adherence to the 
written notice requirement has been the cause of injustice in a number of 
warranty suits. Tersteeg, supra, at 1568; see also Collins v. Buus, No. A05-1771, 2006 
WL 1985431, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. July 18, 2006) (holding that plaintiffs lost their 
claim for breach of statutory warranty because they notified their general 
contractor of the defect through oral conversation rather than written notice).   
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notice of a discovered defect prior to filing suit.198 The builder then 
has a statutory period to respond with an inspection, offer to cure 
the defect, negotiate a settlement, or reject the proposal.199 State 
legislatures passed these statutes in an attempt to curb the 
increasing amount of construction-defect litigation by encouraging 
parties to remedy construction defects through other avenues, such 
as mediation or fixing the defect, before resorting to litigation.200 
These laws were passed in response to builder complaints that 
homeowners prematurely file suit upon notice of any source of 
dissatisfaction, consequently racking up litigation costs and driving 
up builder insurance costs.201 Although these “right to cure” laws 
sometimes interfere with the equitable application of statutes of 
limitations and repose,202 they ultimately serve as another layer of 
protection for builders.203 Despite the fact that the underlying 
policy motivations of decreasing excessive litigation are relevant, 
urgent, and in the best interest of both parties, these laws have 
raised legitimate concerns of inequitable treatment of 
homeowners.204 Not only do these laws create additional obstacles 
for owners with genuine claims,205 but owners also face steep 
 198.  See Allen, supra note 153, ¶ 2.  
199.  In many states, builders have thirty days to respond. Id.   
 200.  See Anders v. Superior Court, 121 Cal. Rptr. 3d 465, 472 (Ct. App. 2011) 
(noting that the legislative history of California’s Right to Repair Act, Sen. Bill No. 
800, emphasizes that “builders, insurers, and other business groups are hopeful 
that this right to repair will reduce litigation” and that one of the main purposes of 
the statute is to “avoid the costs of litigation and the resulting increased costs of 
construction”). It is important to note that many of these “right to cure” statutes 
are triggered upon an owner’s discovery of a defect after the completion of the 
project. See Allen, supra note 153, ¶¶ 2–3.  
 201.  See Boyer, supra note 35, at 31.  
 202.  Id. at 28.  
 203.  Anders, 121 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 472. 
 204.  See Allen, supra note 153, ¶¶ 33–38  (citing concerns that these laws 
enacted to curb litigation seem to only benefit builders); see also Boyer, supra note 
35, at 28 (discussing the inequitable result of mandatory notice and opportunity to 
repair laws when owners discover claims toward the end of a limitation period). 
Boyer cautions that notice and opportunity to repair statutes should include a 
mechanism that allows owners bringing a claim near the end of a limitations 
period to toll the statute of limitations or repose. Id. at 32. In the absence of such 
an exception, owners face the risk of losing legitimate claims and builders are 
incentivized to respond in an untimely fashion. Id. 
 205.  See Allen, supra note 153, ¶¶ 4, 33 (noting concerns that these laws are 
costly and time-consuming for owners, but afford construction companies 
additional legal protections). 
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consequences for not complying with the statutory requirements of 
these laws.206 
These new laws insinuate that current reform efforts are 
focused on decreasing the amount of construction litigation in a 
manner only favorable to builders.207 As construction companies 
have been subject to less and less liability and accountability for 
their alleged wrongful acts, the disparity in bargaining power 
between builders and owners has continued to increase.208 The 
tables have turned—owners are now the disparaged party in need 
of legal protections.209 The higher discovery standard recognizes 
this recent shift in circumstances and seeks to equalize the legal 
footing of both parties. This approach does not aim to remove any 
legal protections for builders; rather, it provides an owner more 
leeway to investigate or solve a defect and protects the owner’s right 
to redress upon discovery that the defect is grave enough to resort 
to litigation.210 
5. Public Policy
Access to the court system is an important right and should not 
be undermined. It is essential to the preservation of our democracy 
and Constitution that every American citizen has the ability to 
exercise her right to be heard in a court of law.211 However, the 
court system does not exist to discourage problem-solving or 
cooperation between parties;212 if it did, litigation would be the 
 206.  See id. ¶¶ 19, 22, 37 (discussing that if an owner does not follow each 
requirement, the owner will not be allowed to file suit until fully repeating the 
statutory process, and that strict adherence to this time-consuming process can 
cause owners to lose their claims to the statute of limitations). 
 207.  Boyer, supra note 35, at 29–31 (discussing various legislations in multiple 
states and how a contractor is protected under them). 
 208.  See Tersteeg, supra note 197, at 1585 (noting that homeowners’ personal 
assets are at risk in construction-defect claims).  
 209.  Id. at 1559 (“Many homeowners have been unhappy to discover that they 
have more consumer protections for a fickle $20 toaster than for a home that 
turns out to be flawed.”). 
 210.  Boyer, supra note 35, at 31 (“[Notice and opportunity to repair statutes] 
require[] an owner to give a builder notice of construction defects and provide an 
adequate opportunity for the builder to repair, or refuse to repair, those defects 
before the owner may initiate formal proceedings.”). 
 211.  See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 212.  See Allen, supra note 153, ¶ 1 (noting that construction “defects create 
animosity between homeowner and builder, leading many homeowners to pursue 
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standard rather than a last resort, and no dispute resolution would 
take place outside of a courtroom.213 The heightened pleading 
standards adopted by the Supreme Court reiterate this concern.214 
During construction, particularly major construction projects, 
it is assumed by all parties involved that there will be minor, fixable 
defects throughout the process. Just because an owner is put on 
notice of these minor defects, it is not expected that they will bring 
suit at that time.215 On the contrary, it is expected that the 
contractors will remedy those minor defects before the “punch list” 
phase—and certainly before a certificate of occupancy is issued.216 
litigation without attempting to negotiate for repairs or other remedies”). 
 213.  Id. ¶ 2 (indicating that many states have enacted right to cure provisions 
to “prevent unnecessary litigation” and allow the contractor an opportunity to 
remedy the defect). 
 214.  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (“While legal conclusions can 
provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual 
allegations.”); see Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–56 (2007) (holding 
that the plausibility standard requires that the plaintiff pleads enough facts to raise 
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the illegal conduct). The 
Twombly Court cited concerns of frivolous claims, judicial inefficiency, and 
increasing litigation costs as justifications for the heightened pleading standard. 
Id. at 562. While the Minnesota Supreme Court recently rejected the Twombly and 
Iqbal heightened pleading standard, the same underlying policy concerns are still 
present. See Walsh v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 851 N.W.2d 598, 606 (Minn. 2014). The 
court reasoned that the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure provided sufficient 
safeguards against lack of clarity and high discovery costs, including a recent 
amendment giving the district court more discretion to manage discovery. Id. at 
605–06 (citing MINN. R. CIV. P. 12.05, 26). However, the Twombly court cautioned 
that judicial supervision as an attempt to curb discovery abuse has not been that 
successful. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559 (quoting Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as 
Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635, 638 (1989)) (“Judges can do little about impositional 
discovery when parties control the legal claims to be presented and conduct the 
discovery themselves.”). 
 215.  See Linn Reorganized Sch. Dist. No. 2 of Osage Cty. v. Butler Mfg. Co., 
672 S.W.2d 340, 342 (Mo. 1984) (holding that evidence that the roof leaked from 
the first day of construction is not sufficient to trigger the statute of limitations). 
The court reasoned that requiring an owner to bring suit upon notice of any 
defect during the construction “would place upon an aggrieved party the task of 
piecemeal litigation. . . . [A] claimant would have to sue a roofer within five years 
of the first leakage, although the remainder of a project might well extend beyond 
a five-year period.” Id.  
 216.  328 Barry Ave., LLC v. Nolan Props. Grp., LLC, 871 N.W.2d 745, 752 
(Minn. 2015). Nolan testified on behalf of 328 LLC that several other minor 
defects, including weather seals on the doors, had been brought to the attention 
of the subcontractors prior to the “punch list” phase of construction. Id. Each of 
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These minor defects are rarely considered grave enough to resort 
to litigation. If this were the standard, builders would not be 
allowed any leeway to make minor mistakes along the way, which 
would substantially harm the construction business. Further, 
common-sense and regard for financial self-interest warrant the 
assumption that owners would not pay subcontractors or 
contractors if they felt that there was a serious pending defect that 
needed to be corrected. Final payment generally signals the end of 
a professional relationship, and the payment would not be 
extended if the paying party felt that the services rendered were 
not adequately performed.217 
Due to the inherent uncertainty of the extent and source of an 
injury while there is still work to be performed, owners should have 
reasonable certainty about these facts before bringing a lawsuit 
against contractors.218 While the term “injury” in Minnesota Statutes 
section 541.051 is somewhat open to interpretation, the policy 
motivations driving the statute of limitations and the history of the 
construction industry indicate that the legislature could not have 
intended “injury” to mean “minor defect.”219 While the statute is 
silent on the meaning of actionable injury, in the interests of 
internal consistency and public policy, this meaning cannot be 
adopted. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s holding in 328 Barry that the 
statute of limitations on construction-defect claims may begin to 
run before construction is substantially complete is a consistent 
reflection of the historic rationale behind the enactment of statutes 
these issues, including the water intrusion injury, had been remedied to NPG’s 
satisfaction during the final phase of construction, prior to the issuance of the 
certificate of occupancy. Id.   
 217.  Id. In explaining his reasonable belief that the initial water intrusion had 
been a minor defect that had been corrected in full, Nolan noted that NPG and all 
the subcontractors had been paid for their work. Id.   
 218.  Hyland Hill N. Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Hyland Hill Co., 538 N.W.2d 479, 
484 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (“It would be unsound public policy to impose a 
stricter rule, requiring a party to investigate all possibilities at the first sign of a 
problem.”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 549 N.W.2d 617 (Minn. 1996). 
 219.  In fact, the dictionary defines “injury” as a “violation of another’s rights 
for which the law allows an action to recover damages.” Injury, MERRIAM-
WEBSTER.COM, supra note 188. 
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of limitations in construction litigation.220 This strict interpretation 
reflects legislative intent to shield construction companies from 
exposure to unjustifiable liability.221 However, while the court 
correctly held that reasonable minds could differ as to what 
constitutes discovery of injury,222 the court missed an opportunity to 
clarify this standard. In the absence of statutory clarity, the court 
should adopt a clear rule governing the meaning of discovery of 
injury to trigger the statute of limitations. In the interests of 
preserving legitimate claims, promoting judicial efficiency, and 
minimizing wasteful expenditure of resources, the statute of 
limitations should begin upon discovery of an injury sufficient for a 
plaintiff to maintain a cause of action. This approach requires 
further investigation between the time a defect is first discovered 
and when the suit is filed to either verify the legitimacy of a claim 
or abate a minor problem. Ultimately, this higher standard, which 
requires plaintiffs to have proof of the injury sufficient to maintain 
a cause of action, lends some certainty to both owners and builders 
as to the limitation period and protects diligent owners against the 
harshness of the traditional discovery rule. 
 220.  Compare 328 Barry, 871 N.W.2d at 751, with infra Part II. 
 221.  Kittson Cty. v. Wells, Denbrook & Assocs., 308 Minn. 237, 241, 241 
N.W.2d 799, 802 (1976).  
 222.  328 Barry, 871 N.W.2d at 751. 
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